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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHEILA ANN COXf SUSAN KELLER 
and SUSAN SMITH, 
Plaint if fs-Appe Hants , 
vs. 
ORRIN G. HATCH, UNION MEMBERS 
FOR HATCH COMMITTEE, FRIENDS 
FOR ORRIN HATCH COMMITTEE, 
HATCH ELECTION COMMITTEE, 
MICHAEL LEAVITT and JOHN DOES 
I-X, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Appeal No. 19357 
ANSWERING BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellants, Cox, Keller and Smith, commenced this 
action in the district court for Salt Lake County, Utah on 
November 12, 1982, seeking special, general and exemplary 
damages against the respondents for claimed violation of Utah's 
Abuse of Personal Identity Act, for invasion of privacy, and 
defamation.—' Appellants' amended complaint contended that such 
1/ 
— Only Orrin G. Hatch and Michael Leavitt were served by appellants with 
process and, thus, are the only respondents that have entered an appearance 
and are before the Court. 
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damages arose out of an allegedly improper use by respondents, 
during Utah's 1982 United States senatorial campaign, of a pho-
tograph of Senator Hatch talking with the three appellants in a 
campaign flyer circulated by the Hatch election forces. A 
reduced copy of the political flyer, entitled "Senator Orrin 
Hatch Labor Letter" is set forth in the appendix to this Brief as 
Attachment 1. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
Respondents filed motions to dismiss and for summary 
judgment under Rules 12(b)(6) and 56, U.R.Civ.P., urging that 
under the free speech provision of the First Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution and for other reasons, the amended complaint 
failed to state a claim, as a matter of law, upon which relief 
could be granted. (R. 23, 24, 52-82) Upon consideration of 
memoranda and oral argument, District Judge Hanson entered an 
order granting defendants' motions and dismissing plaintiffs' 
amended complaint with prejudice on the basis that the publica-
tion of the questioned photograph in the political flyer was 
constitutionally protected under the First Amendment. (R. 84-86, 
101-102)M 
— The district court, in its memorandum decision and order of dismissal, 
found it unnecessary to reach defendants' motions to dismiss on the non-
constitutional grounds that plaintiffs' amended complaint failed, in law, 
to state a cause of action. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants, Cox, Keller and Smith seek reversal of the 
district court order of April 19, 1983, dismissing their amended 
complaint. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was the publication by respondents of the pho-
tograph, picturing Senator Hatch conversing with 
the three unidentified appellants in a political 
flyer during a senatorial election campaign, 
constitutionally protected free speech under the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
against appellants1 claims herein? 
2. Even aside from the First Amendment question, does 
appellants' amended complaint state a claim, in 
law, under the Utah Abuse of Personal Identity Act, 
or for invasion of privacy, or for defamation upon 
which relief could be granted? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CASE 
Appellants' Statement of Facts, as far as it goes, 
generally is unobjectionable. —' However, the Statement is so 
incomplete and the balance of the Brief so convoluted that it is 
3/ 
— However, the statement in appellants' Brief at p.3 that the particular 
photograph in the political advertisement "implied that appellants approved 
or endorsed the reelection of respondent Hatch", is nothing more than 
appellants' personal opinion and is not a fact established by the record. 
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difficult to determine wherein the appellants claim the district 
court erred. Thus, pursuant to Rule 75(p)(2) U.R.Civ.P., respon-
dents will set forth their own facts of the matter, what the 
amended complaint alleged, and what the district court determined. 
1. The Hatch Political Flyer. 
In 1982, the political office of U. S. Senator for Utah 
was before the electorate. The incumbent, Orrin G. Hatch, stood 
for reelection. In October, 1982, during the election campaign, 
the Hatch organization distributed an eight page political 
tabloid, or flyer, entitled "Senator Hatch Labor Letter". The 
flyer included some ten photographs of the Senator talking with 
various persons, none of whom, other than Hatch's family, were 
identified or known. 
The pictures were standard campaign fare — the Senator 
in a hard hat inspecting an industrial facility, the Senator 
sharing a joke with a worker, the Senator chatting with a young 
woman, the Senator looking over the work of three working women 
(the appellants), the Senator talking with an older citizen, etc. 
See Appendix, Attachment 1. 
None of the pictures in the flyer were captioned; their 
purpose was to depict the range of the candidate's cares of and 
interest in the working man and woman. On page 6, the flyer 
included a reproduction of an article by Senator Hatch in First 
Monday, the Republican National Committee's magazine, entitled 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"Bargaining for a Better America". That article set forth the 
Senator's views on trade unionism, government regulation of 
working conditions, and other labor problems. The text was 
interspersed with two photographs, one of the Senator speaking to 
an unidentified middle-aged laborer and the other of the Senator 
examining and/or discussing the work of three unidentified women 
(appellants). Neither picture was titled or captioned and neither 
had any direct connection with the article. The photograph was 
not referred to anywhere in the flyer. 
2. The Complaint of Cox, Keller and Smith. 
The photograph of Senator Hatch with appellants is the 
subject of this lawsuit. Although plaintiffs Cox, Keller and 
Smith were not identified in any way and there was no indication 
that they were Hatch supporters, plaintiffs alleged: 
The use of the plaintiffs1 photograph . . . 
was in such a manner as to imply that the 
plaintiffs herein approved of or endorsed the 
conduct and reelection of the defendant 
Hatch. 
Amended Complaint, 1(9 (R. 15). 
That conclusion is unfounded. The most that can be said 
or inferred from the photograph is that the plaintiffs were 
speaking with Senator Hatch and one apparently was smiling at 
him. The photograph was a typical, contemporary campaign picture, 
as the political flyer was a typical campaign tabloid. Candi-
dates routinely are shown in a variety of situations and with a 
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variety of company, including small children, office-holders even 
of the opposite party, miscellaneous citizens whose politics pre-
sumably are diverse and even a few apolitical dogs and horses. 
Although stated under one count, the amended complaint 
asserted three causes of action (i) abuse of personal iden-
tity (based upon the Utah Abuse of Personal Identity Act, 45-3-1 
et seg. Utah Code Ann. (5A Repl. Vol. 1981)), (ii) invasion of 
privacy and (iii) defamation. (R. 13-18). ' 
The defendants, Hatch and Leavitt, moved to dismiss 
plaintiffs' action on the following grounds: 
a. the entire action was barred by the First Amendment ' 
to the United States Constitution; 
b. the elements of an abuse of identity claim were not 
available; { 
c. the elements of a defamation claim were not avail-
able; 
d. the elements of a claim for invasion of privacy were 
not available. (R. 52-82). 
3. Dismissal Order of District Court. 
After extensive briefing and oral argument, the lower 
court, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, dismissed the amended 
complaint on First Amendment grounds, holding:
 { 
To allow plaintiffs to assert a cause of 
action based upon the photograph as it was 
presented in this particular situation, would 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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impose and constitute a "chilling [e]ffeet" on 
what must be under constitutional principles 
the closely guarded right of free speech, and 
would severely limit a political candidate's 
right to free political expression as consti-
tutionally guaranteed. 
A cause of action as plaintiffs attempt 
to assert would impinge upon defendants right 
of free speech and therefore cannot be consti-
tutionally condoned. ... 
(R. 85). 
See Attachment 2 for the full text of the trial' 
court's memorandum decision. 
Since only Orrin G. Hatch and Michael Leavittf of the five named 
defendants, were served with process and before the court, judg-
ment was entered as to them and made final, pursuant to Rule 
54(b), U.R.Civ.P. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT SOUGHT RELIEF WHICH 
WOULD HAVE IMPERMISSIBLY "CHILLED" FREE SPEECH 
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND IT WAS PROPERLY 
DISMISSED. 
1. The Amended Complaint Raises Respondents' Federal Constitutional 
Rights of Free Speech. 
Appellants' attempt to curtail political speech 
whether they call it abuse of identity, invasion of privacy or 
defamation in their amended complaint is squarely confronted 
by the rights to free speech of the respondents guaranteed under 
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The 
Amendment states in relevant part: 
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"Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, . . . or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech or of the press; 
In the 1925 decision of Gitlow v. New Yorky 268 U.S. 
652 (1925), the U. S. Supreme Court incorporated the free speech 
provisions of the First Amendment within the guaranteed rights 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by the 
statement that: 
For present purposes we may and do assume 
that freedom of speech and of the press — 
which are protected by the First Amendment 
from abridgement by Congress -- are among 
the fundamental personal rights and "liberties" 
protected by the due process clause of the 
14th Amendment from impairment by the states. 
268 U.S. at 666. 
The holding in Gitlow has been consistently affirmed. 
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Bates v. State Bar of 
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
2. Political Campaign Literature is the Most Protected Form of 
Free Speech Under the First Amendment. 
The attempt of appellants to apply the Utah Abuse of 
Identity Act or any other of their claims to the campaign litera-
ture in this case would impose an impermissible "chilling" upon 
political expression. No form of speech is more strictly guarded 
by the First Amendment. As stated by U.S. Supreme Court in 
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971): 
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[T]he constitutional guarantee has its 
fullest and most urgent application pre-
cisely to the conduct of campaigns for 
public office* (Emphasis added). 
Further to the pointr the U. S. Supreme Court has empha-
sized as "unfettered" the First Amendment right of political 
candidates to express their views in the electoral process. In 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. lf 52-53 (1976) f the Court wrote: 
[I]t is of particular importance that 
candidates have the unfettered oppor-
tunity to make their views known so that 
the electorate may intelligently evaluate 
the candidates' personal qualities and their 
positions on vital public issues before 
choosing them on election day. Mr. Justice 
Brandeis1 observation that in our country 
"public discussion is a political duty" 
[citation omitted] applies with special 
force to candidates for public office. 
In the 1980 case of CBS, Inc. v. FCCf 629 F.2d lf 24 
(D.C. Cir. 1980), aff'd, 453 U.S. 367 (1981)f the District of 
Columbia Circuit held: 
The public's right to be informed is nowhere 
stronger than in the area of elections. Andf 
no speech is more protected than political 
speech. 
Political speech is entitled to a higher degree of pro-
tection than is commercial speech. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. 
of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.y 425 U.S. 
748, 778-780 (1976) (Stewart, J. concurring); SEC v. Wall Street 
Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371f 1379-1381 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970). Lamar Outdoor Advertising, Inc. 
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v, Mississippi State Tax Comm'n., 701 F.2d 314, 319 (5th Cir. 
1983), reh. en banc ordered, 701 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1983). 
Restraints which permissibly may be imposed on commer-
cial or other non-political advertising (such as an abuse of 
identity statute) may not be imposed upon political campaign 
literature. See, e.g. , Virginia State Bd. of Pharm v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., supra at 778 n.3 (noting that 
restrictions upon labor practices "would clearly violate First < 
Amendment guarantees if applied to political expression concern-
ing the election of candidates to public office"); SEC v. Wall 
Street Transcript Corp., supra at 1379 (rejecting the "assumption < 
that the activities involved in giving commercial investment 
advice are entitled to the identical constitutional protection 
provided for certain forms of social, political or religious < 
expression"). 
Abuse of identity legislation is intended primarily for 
application to commercial advertising. This is an area of ( 
expression which is given much lighter protection than political 
speech. Indeed, as recently as 1968, the District of Columbia 
Circuit stated: 
Promoting the sale of a product is not ordi-
narily associated with any of the interests 
the First Amendment seeks to protect. As a 
rule, it does not affect the political pro-
cess, does not contribute to the exchange of { 
ideas, [etc.] .... It is rather a form of 
merchandising subject to limitation for public 
purposes like other business practices. 
i 
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Banzhaf v, FCCy 405 F.2d 1082, 1101-1102 (D.C. 
Cir. 1968) , cert, denied sub nom Tobacco Inst,, 
Inc. v, FCC, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). 
Although the United States Supreme Court since has 
rejected the notion that commercial speech "lacks all protection" 
of the First Amendment, e.g. , Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. 
v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 444 U.S. 557, 561 (1980), it still is 
clear that it is much less protected than its political counter-
part. 
3. Appellants1 Position is a Dangerous Threat to First Amendment 
Rights. 
Appellants do not dispute the protected nature of poli-
tical speech. Indeed, it is not even clear whether they dispute 
Judge Hanson's holding that their claims would impermissibly 
chill protected speech. Rather, appellants insist, in Point I 
of their Argument: 
. . . THE USE OF APPELLANTS1 PHOTOGRAPH 
IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED SPEECH 
OR EXPRESSION. Appellants' Br. at 4. 
Thus, appellants claim that use of the questioned photograph in 
respondents' political flyer simply is outside the reach of the 
First Amendment. This neat trick is accomplished by appellants 
setting themselves up as the arbiters of what is or what is not 
political speech, or at least of what is or is not "worthy" poli-
tical speech by the candidate. 
The misuse of their [appellants'] photograph 
in respondents['] campaign advertising is not 
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par t of any p o l i t i c a l discussion on " v i t a l 
p o l i t i c a l i s sues" . Such protect ion would be 
given to Orrin Hatch making statements as to i 
h is opponent's p o l i t i c a l be l i e f s and p o l i c i e s ; 
no such protect ion should be given to Orrin 
Hatch publ ica l ly [sic] and fa lse ly saying tha t 
he is endorsed by three ordinary members of the 
pub l ic , the p l a i n t i f f s in t h i s ac t ion . The 
respondents1 conduct in fa l se ly implying i 
endorsement of Orrin Hatch by the p l a i n t i f f s 
i s not e n t i t l e d to any cons t i t u t i ona l p r i v i l e g e . 
Appellants1 Br. at 12. (Emphasis added). 
Appellants c i t e no author i ty at a l l for t h i s alarming doctr ine 
tha t "worthy" p o l i t i c a l speech is protected while "unworthy" 
speech is not.—' Apparently, appel lants argue that speech which 
they happen to d i s l i k e i s t ru ly " v i t a l " or "worthy" public 
d iscuss ion . Appellants f a i l to recognize that the "F i r s t Amend-
ment is not l imited to ideas , s ta tements , or pos i t ions which are 
accepted" and i t s "standards are not adjusted to a p a r t i c u l a r 
type of publ icat ion or p a r t i c u l a r subject mat te r . " Pring v. 
Penthouse, L td . , 695 F.2d 438, 443 (10th Cir . 1982) pe t i t i on for 
c e r t , f i l e d , 51 U.S.L.W. 3738 (April 3 , 1983) (No. 82-1621). 
Appellants' presumption in determining whose speech i s or i s not worthy 
i s exceeded by t h e i r e a r l i e r presumption in determining whose vote i s or i s 
not worthy. Apparently, vo tes for Senator Hatch were not worthy. Appel-
l an t s contended before the t r i a l court: 
. . .On ly 60% of the people in Utah voted for 
Orrin Hatch . . . . 
I t i s f a l l a c i o u s t o contend that e l e c t i o n s 
or publ ic dec i s ions in campaigns and e l e c t i o n s 
are synonymous with act ions of that idea l 
"reasonable person" that the law e n v i s i o n s . 
A p o l i t i c a l majority swayed and coaxed by 
s l i c k campaigns and p o l i t i c a l gimmicks does 
not s e t the law's idea l "reasonable person" 
standard. (Emphasis added). (R. 98 -99 ) . Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Contrary to the potentially dangerous argument of 
appellants, the United States Supreme Court has emphatically 
held that distinctions between worthy and unworthy political 
speech are constitutionally impermissible. Cohen v. California, 
403 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1971). Defendant Cohen had been fined for 
disturbing the peace in the Los Angeles County Courthouse by 
wearing a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft". This hardly 
was a serious discussion of the Selective Service or of the 
Vietnam conflict. To paraphrase appellants, Cohen was not 
"making statements as to [President Johnson's or General 
Hershey's] political beliefs and policies". Indeed, the State 
defended the prosecution as restraining, not serious speech, but 
merely a "distasteful mode of expression". IxL a t 21• 
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected that argument and such 
attempted "distinctions", holding: 
We cannot sanction the view that the Consti-
tution, while solicitous of the cognitive 
content of individual speech [i.e., "serious" 
discussion], has little or no regard for 
[the] emotive function [e.g., a great deal 
of campaign advertising]... . jnd. at 25. 
Even if it were merely "emotive", the Hatch flyer was political 
5/ 
speech and entitled to the highest constitutional protection. —' 
The Cohen decision is fully consistent with a fundamental rule of 
First Amendment cases: content-based prohibitions on speech (of which a 
"worthiness" test is the most extreme possible example) are impermissible. 
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557, 560 n.3 
(1980); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 n.8 
(1975); Waters v. Chaffin, 684 F.2d 833, 837 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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4. Plaintiffs' Claim, if Permitted to Standy would Chill Speech, 
Plaintiffs nowhere deny that the relief they seek would 
"chill" speech such as that of the Hatch flyer; indeed, they 
appear to acknowledge that it would have that effect. The 
"chilling effect" of plaintiffs' theory is obvious. If plain-
tiffs were to prevail, any photograph of a person published 
without his permission (which, for safety's sake, had better be 
in writing) in the most miniscule of social conversation with a 
candidate for public office would subject the candidate to a 
potential suit for abuse of personal identity. Such a require-
ment necessarily would significantly burden — or "chill" — 
political speech by exposing candidates and their campaign 
organizations to the risk of litigation every time they publish 
an informal photograph. 
An impermissible "chilling" of speech occurs when risks 
of legal liability 
require [those subject to them] to "steer far 
wider of the unlawful zone" [citation omitted] 
than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas 
were clearly marked, . . . by restricting 
their conduct to that which is unquestionably 
safe. Free speech may not be so inhibited. 
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372-73 (1964). 
The First Amendment will not permit a rule 
[which] would invite timidity and self-
censorship and very likely lead to the 
suppression of many items that would otherwise 
be published and that should be made available 
to the public. 
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975). 
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Applying the Abuse of Personal Identity Act or other 
tort claim to campaign literature would create a "forbidden zone" 
which campaign organizations could accommodate only by substan-
tially restricting their advertising practices or obtaining pre-
publication permission from every person shown in every photo-
graphf television commercial, etc., used in the campaign (or in 
fund solicitation, partisan newsletters, etc.). Seeking pre-
publication permission would substantially increase a campaign's 
personnel requirements, would require additional photographs (to 
compensate for the possibility that permission might not be obtained 
for particular photographs), and frequently could compel can-
didates to pay for publication rights (which, in turn, would make 
political advertising even more expensive than it already is). 
Appellants' proposed claims would make use of photo-
graphs or film clips of a candidate with large, transient groups 
of people or with persons not affiliated with his party imprac-
tical, if not impossible. Just how preposterous that requirement 
would be is illustrated below by the attached photographs (Attach-
ments 3, 4, 5 and 6) of President Franklin D. Roosevelt with 
large, obviously diverse groups and also talking to several indi-
viduals in much the same role as Senator Hatch with Cox, Smith 
and Keller. None of the Roosevelt photographs could have been 
used for political campaign purposes in Utah under appellants' 
interpretation of the First Amendment. 
Plaintiffs' proposed rule would adversely affect every 
form of political or public interest advertising. Not only 
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candidates for office, but other groups attempting to influence 
the public (of particular policies or legislation — ranging from 
nuclear disarmament proponents to gun control opponents — and 
even "propagandists" or advocates of various social practices and 
religious persuasions) would be vulnerable to litigation. Under 
appellants' theory of this case, abuse of identity litigation 
easily could become a convenient device for harrassing politi-
cians, activists, or even churches one did not like. 
The First Amendment demands that such potential inhibi-
tion of free speech be nipped in its incipiency. 
In the domain of . . . speech, press or asso-
ciation, the decisions of this Court recognize 
that abridgment of such rights, even though 
unintended, may inevitably follow from various 
forms of governmental action. 
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958). 
[S]tatutes or ordinances that regulate or 
infringe upon the exercise of First Amendment 
rights . . . "must survive the most exacting 
scrutiny." [citation omitted]. [Such a law] 
is presumptively unconstitutional and . . . 
bears the burden of justification. 
Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1246 
(9th Cir. 1981) . 
POINT II 
THE UTAH ABUSE OF PERSONAL IDENTITY 
STATUTE HAS NO APPLICATION TO POLITICAL 
EXPRESSION UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT. 
The general case law forbids abuse of identity claims, 
whether statutory or otherwise, which restrict protected political 
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or editorial — as distinguished from commercial — speech. Cher 
v. Forum International Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 1982). 
In Davis v. Duryea, 99 Misc.2d 933, 417 N.Y.S.2d 624 
(Sup. Ct. 1979) a candidate's commercial contained a photograph 
of Davis, identified as a participant in the Attica prison riots 
who later had been pardoned, with a promise that, if elected, 
candidate Duryea would "'toughen policies on pardons and paroles.'" 
417 N.Y.S.2d at 625. Davis sued under a New York statute, claim-
ing abuse of personal identity. The New York court dismissed the 
action for failure to state a claim on which relief could be 
granted, holding: 
[T]here is no way that a television commercial 
used in a political campaign for governor can 
be construed to be a non-privileged adver-
tising or trade use encompassed within the 
ambit of proscription by the [abuse of identity 
section of the] civil rights Laws. J[d. at 629. 
The Davis court also stated: 
[T]he constitutional requisites of freedom of 
speech . . . . become more imperative and 
irresistibly compelling when those freedoms 
are relevantly exercised during the course of 
and as a part of the electoral process. No 
activity is more basic to the maintenance of 
a democratic society than that which develops 
the knowledge, debate, and information 
necessary to enable our citizens to best 
exercise their electoral franchise, and 
thereby facilitate the election of leaders 
who will guide and shape the policies and 
programs of our institutions. l^ d. at 627. 
In Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F.Supp. 1081 (E.D.Pa. 
1980), an action for abuse of identity brought against a major 
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business news magazine, the federal district court, after 
dismissing the claim on non-constitutional grounds, stated: 
In the event, however, the substantive law 
. . . may have been misconstrued in any of our 
foregoing analyses, . . since the publication 
of the photograph in this case was for the 
sole purpose of illustrating a newsworthy 
article, the defendants would be entitled to 
summary judgment on constitutional grounds. 
Id. at 1089. 
Plaintiffs' claims can neither be squared with Duryea, and Fogel 
nor stand in the face of the unwavering U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sions regarding the integrity of political speech under the First 
Amendment. 
The Application of the Utah Statute. 
The Utah Abuse of Personal Identity Act should not reach 
beyond business advertising or comparable activities. It cannot 
reach purely political expression. It is one thing to impose a 
consent requirement — which, in effect, means a financial 
requirement — upon commercial advertising. Such advertising is 
relatively unprivileged speech and decisions to advertise commer-
cially are made on a cost-effectiveness basis. However, the 
constitutional guarantee of free speech does not permit a similar 
burdening of political advertising. It likewise is impermissible 
to restrict such political speech by calling it an "invasion of 
privacy" or "defamation." 
Appellants' claims are irreconcilable with the Supreme 
Court's mandate in Buckley v. Valeo (supra, 424 U.S. at 52-53) 
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that "candidates have the unfettered opportunity" to promote 
their candidacies. The remedy for perceived abuse of political 
speech, wrote Justice Brandeis, is "more speech, not enforced 
silence." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927). 
Appellants1 remedy, if they need one, must be speech of 
their own — in letters to the editor, or radio and television 
interviews in which they denounce or disclaim any support of 
Senator Hatch, the candidate. But they cannot seek recourse 
under the Abuse of Personal Identity Statute without running 
aground the First Amendment. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it 
bluntly in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281 
(1964): 
The importance to the state and to society of 
such discussions is so vast, and the advan-
tages derived are so great, that they more 
than counterbalance the inconvenience of pri-
vate persons whose conduct may be involved, 
and occasional injury to the reputations of 
individuals must yield to the public welfare, 
although at times such injury may be great. 
The public benefit from publicity is so great, 
and the chance of injury to private character 
so small, that such discussion must be privi-
leged • • • • 
POINT III 
APPELLANTS' CLAIM THAT THEY ARE EXEMPT FROM 
FIRST AMENDMENT RESTRICTIONS IS DEVOID OF 
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY. 
Appellants claim that their photograph, unidentified 
as it was, with Orrin Hatch in the political campaign flyer is 
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actionable under the Utah Abuse of Identity Act even if that 
results in a "chilling" of political speech. Indeed, it is 
argued in appellants' Brief: 
The fact that some government restrictions 
[the Utah Act] placed upon freedom of expres-
sion create a "chilling effect" in the exercise 
of these rights is not sufficient to prohibit 
this regulation. Appellants' Br. at 4. 
The flaw in appellants' contention is that it not only lacks any 
supporting case precedent, but the authoritative holdings are 
flatly against the proposition. The attempt to rely at page 4 of 
their Brief, upon Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), is quite 
unavailing. In Younger, the defendant, indicted in a California 
court on charges of criminal syndicalism, sought a federal 
injunction arresting the state proceedings on First Amendment 
grounds. The U.S. Supreme Court denied the injunction on proce-
dural grounds, holding that the place to address the constitu-
tional questions was a direct defense to the state indictment. 
The Court, in Younger, did not begin to address what was or was 
not an impermissible "chilling" of free speech. 
Younger does contain a statement of no more than obiter 
dictum that where state regulation has only a minor or incidental 
impact upon speech, the regulation may be upheld. Id_. at 51. 
However, the Younger dictum does not begin to touch upon the area 
of political speech or expression. If a state regulation pre-
sents even the most minimum risk that political speech will be 
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impairedf much less jeopardized, the attempted regulation will 
fall under the weight of the First Amendment. Buckley v. Valeof 
supra. State regulation of essentially commercial speech under an 
abuse of identity act is one thing for example, preventing 
the use of a photograph of Clint Eastwood to sell cigars or a 
movie of Bob Hope's lifef without their consent and without 
paying for the obvious value of their likenesses. But it is quite 
another matter to apply the Act in the regulation of political 
speech of a candidate for public office. The latter is constitu-
tionally proscribed, Monitor Patriot Co, v> Roy, supra, and the 
obiter dictum in Younger does not begin to suggest otherwise. It 
has no application to the instant case. 
United States v. Baranski, 484 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1973), 
also cited at page 4 of appellants1 Brief is as inapplicable as 
Younger. Baranski involved a prosecution of four individuals 
who went to a local draft board, pulled out filing cabinets and 
poured animal blood over the files. They were charged with 
willful damage of government property, mutilation and destruction 
of records, interference with the administration of the Selective 
Service Act and conspiracy to commit those offenses. The Seventh 
Circuit properly recognized that destroying records (or any other 
property) simply is not "speech". 
Further, appellants, at page 7 of their Brief, erro-
neously attempt to rely on Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 
(1972), in which the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the question of 
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whether a newspaper reporter had a constitutional right to refuse 
to reveal his sources in a judicial proceeding. Branzburg did not 
involve a restraint of speech, but a claim of an alleged adverse 
secondary impact upon journalism if the reporter were required to 
testify. It is of no assistance. 
The balance of appellants1 Brief is an assortment of 
unhelpful citations and irrelevant arguments. At page 8 of their 
Brief, appellants cite Greer v. Spocky 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976), 
a case wherein the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a military regula-
tion against political demonstrations and similar activities on 
the military reservation at Fort Dix, New Jersey. Unremarkably, 
the Court held that Fort Dix's primary business was to train 
soldiers, not to provide a public forum. However, the Court 
emphasized that the regulation did not authorize the military 
authorities to prohibit the distribution of conventional politi-
cal campaign literature. J[d_. at 834-835. 
Further, appellants cite an excerpt from Consolidated 
Edison Co* v. Public Serv. Comm'n, supra, at page 8 of their 
Brief. Appellants would have done well to cite this case at more 
length. In Consolidated Edison, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
the New York Public Service Commission could not constitutionally 
prohibit Consolidated Edison from including, in its monthly bills, 
inserts expressing the company's viewpoint on controversial 
issues of public policy. The Court held that: 
[A] constitutionally permissible time, place 
or manner restriction may not be based upon 
either the content or subject matter of 
speech. . . . 
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The First Amendment's hostility to content-
based regulation extends not only to restric-
tions on particular viewpoints, but also to 
prohibition of public discussion of an entire 
topic. As a general matter, "the First 
Amendment means that government has no power 
to restrict expression because of its message, 
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content," 
[citation omitted] . Id_. at 537. 
The subject State action is neither a valid 
time, place or manner restriction, nor a per-
missible subject matter regulation, nor a 
narrowly drawn prohibition justified by com-
pelling state interest, I_d. at 544. 
Interestingly, appellants cite Consolidated Edison immediately 
after a statement in their Brief that: 
[R]espondents apparently determined that Senator 
Hatch's views on labor and unions needed to be 
progandized in his effort to obtain support 
from Utah union members in his bid for re-
election. This decision alone, in the context 
of a re-election, does not extend any consti-
tutional right to propagandize Senator Hatch's 
views, whenever, however and wherever he or 
his campaign staff choose. Appellant's Br. at 8. 
In fact, the rationale of Consolidated Edison, as well 
as numerous other cases cited above, indicates emphatically that 
Senator Hatch and his campaign staff indeed are entitled - sub-
ject to only the narrowest of limitations - to "propagandize" 
his views "whenever, however, and wherever he or his campaign 
staff choose." 
Appellants devote page 9 through 12 of their Brief to 
the curious argument that they are not "public figures" within 
the meaning of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
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(1964) , or later cases. This is a rather peculiar addition to 
appellants' Brief, inasmuch as that issue was neither argued or 
raised by respondents before the district court nor does it have 
any relevance to this appeal. 
Appellants are forced to argue that the Utah Abuse of 
Identity Act contains 
reasonable restrictions as to the time, place 
and manner of advertising; those provisions 
are permissible restrictions upon free speech 
even of a political nature. Appellants' Br. 
at 13. 
Appellants cite no authority, whatsoever, for that proposition 
and for good reason there is none. It is clear from the 
binding precedent Buckley, Consolidated Edison and the others 
—— that restrictions upon the time, place and manner of political 
speech are profoundly disfavored and that such restrictions may 
not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech. 
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, supra at 541. 
Finally, the claim of appellants that they merely advo-
cate in this case "restrictions as to time, place and manner" of 
political advertising and not advertising itself (Br. at 13) is 
disingenuous and utter nonsense. Their claim, unveiled in its real 
form, is that the Hatch campaign was not entitled to publish the 
subject photograph in the political flyer at any time, anywhere, 
or in any manner. That restriction is, of course, the gravamen 
of the constitutional offense under the First Amendment. 
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In sum, the simple fact is that appellants' argument 
that they may sue the respondents for the publication of the pho-
tograph in the political flyer without squarely infringing 
respondents' First Amendment rights of free speech, is without 
any authoritative precedent, whatsoever. Stacked against it is 
nearly 50 years of case law of the United States Supreme Court 
and other courts. Acceptance of appellants' position in this 
appeal would not only "chill" political speech and expression, 
it would strangle it. 
The ruling of the trial judge determined that respon-
dents' First Amendment rights would be in serious jeopardy if the 
amended complaint were permitted to stand. That ruling should be 
affirmed. 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD AVAILABLE 
TO IT OTHER, ALTERNATIVE 
GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL 
1. The Facts Alleged by the Amended Complaint did not amount 
to a Claim upon Which Relief could be Granted under the Abuse 
of Personal Identity Act. 
The Abuse of Personal Identity Act provides: 
The personal identity of an individual is 
abused if: 
(1) An advertisement is published in which 
the personal identity of that individual is 
used in a manner which expresses or implies 
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that the individual approves, endorses, has 
endorsed, or will endorse the specific subject 
matter of the advertisement; and 
(2) Consent has not been obtained for such 
use from the individual ... . 
UTAH CODE ANN. §45-3-3 (1981 Repl. Vol.). 
The photograph in the Hatch flyer is not actionable 
under the statute. 
(a) Appellants' claim is based upon an unsupportable 
inference. The complained-of photograph did not represent that 
appellants had endorsed Senator Hatch. Just as clearly, it did 
not "imply" an approval or endorsement. An "implication" is a 
"necessary deduction from the circumstances, general language or 
conduct of the parties." Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dryden, 
492 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Mo. App. 1973) (Emphasis added). 
Whether a document is capable of supporting an 
actionable inference is a question of law, which may be disposed 
of by summary judgment. Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., supra at 1084; 
H.O. Merrin & Co. v. A. H. Belo Corp., 228 F. Supp. 515, 521 
(N.D. Tex. 1969). It is particularly appropriate that a claim 
based upon an unreasonable inference be summarily dismissed when 
it is directed against the exercise of free speech. Fadell v. 
Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 425 F. Supp. 1075, 1085 (N.D. Ind. 
1976) (stating that such a suit's "'chilling effect' . . . on 
First Amendment rights calls for a judicial attitude more 
favorable toward summary judgment"); Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F. 
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Supp. 29, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), afffdy 580 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 
1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). 
The proper disposition of an inadequate claim for abuse 
of identity is illustrated in Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., supra, in 
which summary judgment was entered in defendant's favor. The 
action arose from an article in Forbes Magazine concerning Latin 
American investment and consumption in Miami. It stated that 
numerous Latin American tourists bought great quantities of 
American goods in Miami and resold them at home for three or four 
times the purchase price. The article included a photograph of 
plaintiffs (who were Philadelphians, not Latin Americans), along 
with one other person (beside a couple of airline employees) 
standing at the Pan American Airways counter at Miami International 
Airport with numerous boxes of merchandise and at least one 
Spanish-language wrapper in the foreground. The photograph was 
captioned "The Load: Some Latins buy so much in Miami they've 
been known to rent an extra hotel room just to store their 
purchases." _Id. at 1083-84. (The Forbes photograph of the Fogels 
is reproduced at page 1094 of the decision and is annexed hereto 
as Attachment 6. They look at least as much like Latin Americans 
with an accumulation of packages as appellants look like 
Republicans with a GOP candidate.) 
The Fogels sued, alleging defamation and appropriation 
of their likenesses in that 
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I 
• . • . their appearance in the photograph creates 
the innuendo that they are participating in 
the activity described in the article, that 
isf buying merchandise in Miami for sale in 
Latin America, ^d. at 1085 (Emphasis added). 
The Forbes court dismissed both the defamation and appropriation 
claims, holding: 
The court finds that the picture and the 
article are not reasonably capable of con-
veying the meaning or the innuendo ascribed 
by plaintiffs . . . . [I]f the publication 
is not in fact libelous, it cannot be made 
so by innuendo which puts an unfair and 
forced construction on the interpretation 
of the communication. 
Id. at 1085 (Emphasis added). 
[W]e find that the picture and the article 
are not reasonably capable of conveying 
the meaning . . . ascribed by the plaintiffs 
as the basis for their invasion of privacy 
claim. 
Id. at 1088. 
Appellants propose at least as "unfair and forced" a 
construction of the Hatch photograph as the Fogels proposed of 
the Forbes article. On that basis alone, the amended complaint 
should have been dismissed. > 
(b) Appellants' claim is based upon a mere incidental 
use of their photograph, which is not actionable under the Abuse 
of Identity Act. An incidental use of a person's identity—as 
distinguished from a claim of endorsement or approval—in adver-
tising or other publications is not actionable as a misappropria-
tion of identity. Ladany v. William Morrow & Co., 465 F. Supp. 
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870, 780-882 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (g r an t ing summary judgment) ; Univer-
s i t y of Notre Dame v . Twent ie th Century-Fox Film Corp , , 15 N.Y.2d 
940, 259 N.W.S.2d 440, 207 N.E.2d 508 (1965) (af f i rming summary 
judgment ) . The Massachuset t s Supreme Court h e l d , in Tropeano v . 
A t l a n t i c Monthly, I n c . , 400 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Mass 1980): 
[T]he c r u c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n . . . must be [drawn] 
between s i t u a t i o n s in which the defendant 
makes an i n c i d e n t a l use of the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
name, p o r t r a i t or p i c t u r e and those in which 
the defendant uses the p l a i n t i f f ' s name, 
p o r t r a i t or p i c t u r e d e l i b e r a t e l y t o e x p l o i t 
i t s va lue for a d v e r t i s i n g or t r a d e purposes .§/ 
(Emphasis added) . 
Accord, Namath v . Spor t s I l l u s t r a t e d , 48 A.D.2d 487, 371 N.Y.2d 
10, 11 (1975) , a f f ' d , 39 N.Y.2d 897, 386 N.Y.2d 397, 352 N.E.2d 
584 (1977) . Fogel v . Forbes , supra a t 1089; Nelson v . Maine 
Times, 373 A.2d 1221 (Me. 1977) . 
The complained-of " app rop r i a t i on"—assuming , arguendo, 
t h a t i t occurred a t a l l—was as " i n c i d e n t a l " , i f not more s o , to 
the Hatch adver t i sement as the Tropeano photograph was to the 
A t l a n t i c Monthly a r t i c l e (or as Joe Namath's i n s t a n t l y r ecogn i -
zab le photograph and name were t o a Spo r t s I l l u s t r a t e d adver -
t i sement (Namath v. Spor t s I l l u s t r a t e d , s u p r a ) ) . A p p e l l a n t s ' 
c la im i s as d e f e c t i v e as the foregoing a c t i o n s . 
— Appellants1 claim is very analogous to the claim brought under 
Massachusetts identity statute (similar to Utah's) and rejected in 
Tropeano. Ms. Tropeano1s photograph appeared in an ar t ic le entitled 
"After the Sexual Revolution." She, like appellants, was not identified 
in the a r t ic le , supra at 848. 
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The instant action does not come within either the terms 
of the Utah Act or the recognized definitions of appropriation of 
identity. The abuse of identity claims are deficient on statu-
tory as well as constitutional grounds. 
2. The Amended Complaint did not Allege the Elements of an 
Action for Defamation. An actionable defamation, under Utah law, 
is a statement 
. . . expressed either by printing or by signs 
or pictures . . . tending to blacken the 
memory of one who is dead, or to impeach the 
honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation, 
publish the natural defects of one who is 
alive, and thereby to expose him to public 
hatred, contempt or ridicule. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §45-2-2 (1981 Repl. Vol.) 
The statute (as well as the case law of other 
jurisdictions) would have required findings: 
a. that the photograph implied that plaintiffs 
were endorsing Senator Hatch; and 
b. that being described as a supporter of a man 
recently re-elected to the United States Senate by 60 percent 
plurality tends to impeach one's honesty, integrity, virtue 
or reputation. 
These requirements are stated conjunctively in the statute. 
Therefore, plaintiffs' failure to establish either would defeat 
their claim. 
As has been pointed out in this Brief, the questioned 
photograph did not reasonably imply that plaintiffs were Hatch 
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supporters. In a defamation action, it is the trial court's duty 
initially to determine whether the communication complained of is 
capable of a defamatory meaning* Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., supra 
at 1084; H. O. Merrin & Co. v. A* H. Belo Corp., supra at 512. 
If this threshold matter is decided against plaintiffs, the case 
is ended. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §614, Comment (b)(1977). 
The failure of the second element of appellants' case 
also is evident. Perhaps one may not wish to have his picture 
taken with a candidate who is of a different political persuasion, 
but one does not become an outcast by doing so. By any objective 
standard, plaintiffs cannot be deemed defamed. 
The test of whether a publication is defama-
tory is whether, in the circumstances, the 
writing discredits the plaintiff "in the minds 
of any considerable and respectable segment of 
the community." [citation omitted]. 
Tropeano v. Atlantic Monthly Co., supra at 851. 
Accord, Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., supra; Campbell v. Seabury Press, 
486 F.Supp. 298, 301 (N.D. Ala. 1979). Appellants have not 
claimed that any segment of the community deemed them dishonest, 
unvirtuous, etc., by reason of having been photographed with a 
United States Senator. The most harm plaintiffs can claim is 
that they were questioned by their Post Office supervisors about 
a possible violation of the Hatch Act's prohibition of political 
activity by civil servants. Appellants' Br. at 3, 12. That 
hardly creates an imputation of dishonesty. 
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3. The Amended Complaint does not Allege the Elements of a 
Claim for Invasion of Privacy. Appellants' final claim is for 
"invasion of privacy". The right of privacy did not exist at 
common law. It is a twentieth century invention which has come 
to include four elements: (i) intrusion upon seclusion, (ii) 
appropriation of name of likeness, (iii) publicity given to 
private life, and (iv) publicity placing a person in false light. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §652B-E. 
The right to name or likeness, of course, is the subject 
of the Abuse of Identity Act in Utah. The rights and remedies 
provided by that statute are exclusive. Silverstein v. Sisters 
of Charity, etc., 38 Colo. App. 286, 559 P.2d 716, 718 (1972); 
Dupree v. Richardson, 314 F.Supp. 1260, 1262 (W.D. Pa. 1970). 
The flaws in plaintiffs' identity claim already have been 
treated. 
There was no intrusion upon plaintiffs' seclusion; they 
were photographed in a public place. The intrusion argument of 
appellants is clearly insufficient. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS, §652B; Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F.Supp. 858, 861 (W.D. 
Pa 1976). Similarly, there can be no claim here of wrongful 
publicity of plaintiffs' private lives. It repeatedly has been 
held that a photograph of a person in a public or semi-public 
situation (on the street, at work, etc.) will not support such a 
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claim. e.g. Arrington v. New York Times Co., 449 N.Y.S.2d 941f 
434 N.E.2d 1319 (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §652D, 
Illustrations 4, 5. 
The only privacy claim which conceivably is left to 
plaintiffs is one for publicity allegedly placing them in a false 
light. However, that tort, as defined by the Restatement, did 
not occur here. 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning 
another that places the other before the public 
in a false light is subject to liability to the 
other for invasion of his privacy, if 
(a) the false light in which the other 
was place would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person, and 
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted 
in a reckless disregard as to the falsity of 
the publicized matter and the false light in 
which the other would be placed. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §652E. 
The only "false light" of which plaintiffs complain is 
an alleged appearance of talking with Senator Hatch. That com-
munication is hardly something "highly offensive to a reasonable 
person." It has been held, apparently without exception, that 
offensiveness in privacy cases is to be determined by an objec-
tive standard, not by plaintiff's professed subjective sen-
timents. 
The protection afforded by the law of this 
right relates to ordinary sensibilities and 
cannot extend to "supersensitiveness or 
agoraphobia." [citation omitted]. Nelson 
v. Maine Times, supra at 1224 (Me. 1973) 
(affirming dismissal). 
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Accord, Mark v. King Broadcasting Co., 27 Wash. App. 344, 618 
P.2d 512, 519 (1980), a f f ' d , 96 Wash.2d 473, 635 P.2d 1081 
(1981), c e r t , denied, 457 U.S. 1124 (1981); Blount v. TD Publ. 
Corp., 77 N.M. 384, 423 P.2d 421 (1966). 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The cons t i t u t i ona l question in t h i s case i s of momentous 
consequence. There is more involved than j u s t appe l lan t s ' claim 
tha t t he i r unident i f ied photograph with Senator Hatch in a Hatch 
p o l i t i c a l f lyer v iola ted the Utah Abuse of Personal Iden t i ty 
l e g i s l a t i o n , and fur ther , invaded t h e i r privacy and was defama-
to ry . The bedrock question before the Court tha t cannot be 
ignored is whether the guarantees of free p o l i t i c a l speech under 
the F i r s t Amendment of the United Sta tes Const i tut ion are to be 
preserved against the threatened encroachment of appe l lan t s . Too 
many of the most noted statesmen and j u r i s t s have spoken on the 
importance of free p o l i t i c a l speech for there to ex i s t any doubt 
as to i t s p r i o r i t y in our soc ie ty . Nor has the precept been of 
7/ recent invention.—' 
- ' I t should not be overlooked that A r t i c l e I Sect ion 15 of the Utah State 
Const i tut ion a l s o guards against infringement on free speech by the s t a t e -
ment that 
"No law should be passed to abridge or res tra in 
freedom of speech ***." 
See a l s o A r t i c l e I Sect ion 1 of the Utah State Const i tut ion providing that 
"All men have the inherent and unalienable r ight *** t o communicate f ree ly 
t h e i r thoughts and opinions ***." 
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As Mr. Justice Brandeis put it in Whitney v. California/ 
supra at 375 (1927) : 
Those who won our independence *** believed 
that freedom to think as you will and to speak 
as you think are means indispensable to the 
discovery and spread of political truth; that 
without free speech and assembly, discussion 
would be futile; . • . 
When appellants' claims are weighed against the rights 
of free political speech under the First Amendment guaranteed to 
the respondents, the determination of this case is not even a 
close call. The constitutional arguments are dispositive, and 
quickly so. 
Much could be said about the abject failure of the 
appellants to marshal any authoritative, constitutional precedent 
to support their positions. It is probably sufficient to say 
that this failure merely underscores the significance of the 
constitutional issue. The proposition is simple — the photo-
graph of the unidentified appellants with Senator Hatch in the 
political flyer was in the exercise of the "unfettered" right of 
political speech in this Country. No matter how the appellants 
may strive to characterize their claim as abuse of identity, 
invasion of privacy or defamation, the publication is protected 
speech under the First Amendment and is not actionable. 
The trial judge was convinced that appellants' amended 
complaint presented such serious jeopardy to political speech that 
a dismissal was entered on the constitutional ground, alone, 
without ever reaching the issue of whether the amended complaint 
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stated a claim for relief for abuse of personal identity, defama-
tion or invasion of privacy. It is respectfully submitted that 
this Court conclude likewise and affirm. 
Even were it assumed, arguendo, that the constitutional 
issue were not present, it is, nonetheless, plain that appellants' 
amended complaint fails to state a claim for relief on any of 
their three theories. Accordingly, the dismissal by the trial 
court could be and, if necessary, should be affirmed on non-
constitutional grounds. 
It is earnestly suggested, however, that this case 
should turn unequivocally on First Amendment grounds, that the 
questioned photograph in the political flyer is protected speech 
thereunder, and that the district court order of dismissal with 
prejudice be affirmed by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD R. FERRARI 
of 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Orrin G. Hatch and Michael 
Leavitt 
Dated: December 7, 1983 
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^Senator—— - . 
Or r in Hatch 
LABOR LETTER 
Hatch Supports 
of 
Senator Hatch Fights for Jobs 
and Economic Growth for Utah 
Hatch Wants 
Aid for Laid-
Off Workers 
Concerned about the adverse effects of 
mass layoffs and plant closings in Utah, 
Senator Hatch has introduced the "Dis-
placed Worker Readjustment Act" in Con-
gress. If passed, it means that workers put 
out of jobs by plant closures and layoffs 
could get help in finding aid and new jobs. 
This measure would encourage em-
ployers to provide advance notice of an im-
pending layoff or plant closing. This warn-
ing would trigger a management-labor-
community council meeting to develop 
ways for adversely affected workers to be 
absorbed into other businesses and in-
dustries and for the economic impact on 
the community to be minimized. 
Additionally, the bill provides for a 
series of re-training and re-adjustment ser-
vices for displaced workers before avail-
able unemployment benefits expire. 
"In Utah, 6,500 people have been dis-
placed due to plant closings and major 
layoffs between October, 1981 and March 
1982. These figures are overwhelming," 
Senator Hatch stated. 
"This legislation attempts to tackle 
the problem of employers' reluctance to 
admit they are in difficulty sufficient to 
threaten major cutbacks or cessation of 
operations and the problem of displaced 
workers' exhausting their unemployment 
compensation waiting to be recalled," 
Hatch said. 
"We need to look at the larger issue of 
worker displacement and to investigate 
ways of uniting the efforts of existing agen-
cies with employers to help workers." 
Unemployment 
Benefits 
Senator Hatch recently supported the crea-
tion of a new program for helping the 
22,000 Utahns receiving federal unemploy-
ment benefits. The Federal Supplemental 
Benefits program will permit an additional 
10 weeks of unemployment benefits to be 
made available to Utah. 
"Since June 1, uninsured unemployed 
Utahns qualify for 39 weeks of unemploy-
ment benefits—26 weeks of regular bene-
fits and 13 weeks of extended benefits. The 
tax package qualifies these people for 10 
additional weeks of supplemental benefits, 
raising the total length of eligibility to 49 
weeks," Hatch said. 
"With the national unemployment at 
9.8 percent and Utah unemployment as 
high as 8 percent, these supplemental 
benefits will greatly help families and in-
dividuals financially while unemployed," 
Hatch said. 
In his first term in the U.S. Senate Orrin 
Hatch has made saving jobs and helping 
economic growth in Utah his top priority. 
High on the list of accomplishments was 
helping to save Geneva Steel. 
All members of the Utah delegation 
met continually and worked within the 
federal bureaucracy to save the Geneva 
plant, which was threatened with closing 
because of Clean Air Standards imposed 
by the Environmental Protection Agency. 
Their efforts helped to save 5,600 
direct jobs, 15,000 indirect jobs, and $1 
billion to the economy of Utah. 
Senator Hatch met repeatedly with offi-
cers of U.S. Steel to reach an acceptable so-
lution to save Geneva. Finally, he convinced 
U.S. Steel to allow the media on the pre-
mises of the Geneva plant and alerted the 
public to the extreme E.P.A. approaches. 
In a similar effort, Kennecott Copper 
Corporation was faced with compliance 
with unreasonable and unnecessarily 
stringent capacity standards, which would 
have shut it down. Senator Hatch again 
worked with E.P.A. to be sure standards 
were fair and reasonable. This kept Kenne-
cott open, thus saving 7,000 direct jobs! 
Recently, attempts have been made to 
expand the Clean Air Act, which would 
close approximately 36 percent of the 
State of Utah from significant develop-
ment. A power plant has already been stop-
ped, and other projects, such as a syn-
thetic fuels project, might well be preclud-
ed or delayed so long that costs could be 
prohibitive. 
Senator Hatch, with Senator Gam and 
Governor Matheson, is vigorously opposing 
the concept of "integral vistas" and other 
proposed amendments to the Clean Air 
Act, which would have negative impacts 
upon the citizens of the State of Utah. 
Senator Hatch has also opposed a similar 
amendment to the Clean Water Act. 
While proper amendments to the 
Clean Air Act are necessary for the preser-
vation of the right of the State to preserve 
existing jobs, to create new jobs and have 
affordable energy, Senator Hatch is also 
dedicated to maintaining vital resources as 
clean and pure as possible. 
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Hatch 
Helps 
Utahns 
Everyday special requests and 
inquiries come in to Senator 
Hatch's office from Utah 
citizens who are having 
special problems with govern-
ment agencies, need some 
special assistance or who are 
just saying, "Please, help!" 
These cases are handled 
routinely with care and con-
cern until the problem is solv-
ed or some resolution can be 
reached. 
The figures listed below 
represent a combined total of 
cases handled in Utah and in 
the Washington office during 
the first five years of the 
Senator's term: 
1977-1,947 
1978 — 2,210 
• 1979 — 2,500 
1980 — 2,850 
1981 — 3,400 
Total — 12,907 
Examples of Service to Utahns 
• Back Pay for Black Lung 
Benefits 
Due to the work of Senator 
Hatch, a gentleman received 
$20,000 in back pay for black 
lung benefits. Without Senator 
Hatch's intervention, he would 
probably have never known 
that he qualified. 
• Social Security Payments 
A women, home bound and a 
widow, was suddenly denied 
Social Security payments 
when her name was improper-
ly deleted from the computer. 
She and her family tried for 
five months to get the matter 
resolved, without success. 
Senator Hatch's staff went to 
work on it and in two days she 
was sent an emergency check 
for the five months and re-
enrolled in the system. 
• Immigration Problem Solved 
A young man was called on a 
mission by the LDS Church to 
Mexico. He was a Mexican 
citizen, deserted by his 
parents in the U.S., and 
adopted and raised by a Utah 
family. Before leaving for his 
mission, he was assured by 
the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service that he would 
have no problem returning to 
this country. However, when 
he concluded his two-year mis-
sion in Mexico, he was told he 
could never return to his fami-
ly in the U.S. Senator Hatch 
fought a private bill through 
the Senate and the House to 
reunite the youngster and his 
family. 
• Handicapped Job 
Opportunities 
A handicapped Mexican-
American wanted to work for 
the Post Office. He had train-
ed as a janitor, had worked for 
the University of Utah for 
several years, and had a spot-
less record. USPS said his 
"spastic" condition was a 
danger to himself and his 
fellow employees. After 
several letters from this office 
with no result, Senator Hatch 
UNITED STATES SENATOR 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 
ORRING. HATCH 
UTAH 
Dear Union Member, 
You might be surprised to be hearing from me. It's no secret that I'm not exactly the favorite Senator of 
many Washington labor leaders. And while you've probably been given alot of "information" about my 
record in the Senate, I wanted to take this opportunity to give you my side, because I believe Utahns are 
fair-minded and willing to make an independent decision based on facts—not heated rhetoric. 
I want you to know that my roots are in the union movement. My Dad has been a strong union sup-
porter all his life. Like him, I apprenticed in the building trades as a metal lather and was a card-carrying 
union member for several years. I have not forgotten these roots, what it means to work with your hands, 
and I never will. 
Frankly, I think I've worked hard to promote your interests. Let me give you just a few examples: 
• Introduced the Displaced Workers Act, to provide job-training and assistance for workers hurt by 
layoffs. 
• Supported a 13 week extension in unemployment benefits. 
• Sponsored the Training for Jobs Act which recently passed Congress and will provide job training for 
thousands of workers. 
• Supported full funding of dual benefits for railroad retirees. 
• Opposed proposals to merge Railroad Retirement and Federal pension plans with Social Security. 
• Sponsored the Black Lung Reform Act which saved the Black Lung Benefit fund for miners from 
bankruptcy. 
• Have supported union workers at Dugway who have fought to keep their jobs from being taken over by 
outsiders. 
• Have assisted numerous AFGE members in disputes with federal supervisors, including opening the Tox-
ic Chemical investigation at Hill Air Force Base. 
• Sponsored legislation to crack-down on imports of cheap, subsidized foreign steel. 
I've also been a strong advocate of industrial development in Utah to provide the critical jobs we need. I've 
worked with Kennecott Copper, Geneva Steel, and others in negotiations with EPA to ensure that over-
regulation didn't force these plants to close. I've promoted the export of Utah coal to Taiwan, and en-
couraged development of Utah's many resources. You see, I understand that while clean air is important, 
so are jobs. I'd rather see Utahns working in key industries like Kennecott than have the political endorse-
ment of environmental extremists groups. 
As chairman of the Labor Committee I'm in a critical position when it comes to the issues most impor-
tant to Utah workers. My opponent has criticized me for my chairmanship, claiming that the Labor Com-
mittee isn't important to Utah. You and I know better. 
I realize we won't agree on every issue. But I honestly believe that in all my work in the Senate I have 
put the interests of Utah's rank and file workers first. My door is open, and always will be, to Utah 
workers. 
One final point. Everyone knows that our economic mess has been growing for years. I believe that we 
are making the tough decisions that will turn our economy around, that we are going in a new direction. 
The basic question to be answered this November is whether we are going to continue in this new direction, 
or whether we are going to return to the failed policies of yesterday. 
I invite you to join me in continuing in the new direction which will restore our economy to health and 
vitality, and mean increased opportunity and prosperity for all Utah workers. I hope you'll support our ef-
forts to turn America around when you vote this November 2. 
[ \ Sincerely, 
Orrin G. Hatch 
PAID FOR BY HATCH ELECTION COMMITTEE 
personally called the district 
office of the Post Office and 
said, "I will take 
responsibility". The man was 
hired and has been an ex-
emplary employee. 
• Forest Service Grazing Fine 
A rancher in Rich county 
unintentionally violated a 
Forest Service procedure by 
allowing a neighbor to use 
some of his grazing allotment. 
He was fined nearly $3,000 by 
the USFS. After several 
meetings, including a hearing 
in Wyoming on the matter, the 
USFS relented and eliminated 
the fine. 
• HUD Service Improved 
The Federal Housina Authoritv 
was the subject of a series of 
complaints by local realtors 
and builders. They were told of 
poor service, delays, and in-
consistent appraisals. Senator 
Hatch asked the State Director 
of HUD if he would attend a 
public forum in Provo. He and 
the Regional Director went to 
Provo with Senator Hatch to 
face 250 concerned citizens. 
The three hour meeting re-
sulted in changes in two im-
portant office procedures in 
FHA, a promise of better ser-
vice, and few complaints have 
been heard since. 
• Post Office closure 
The Ogden Post Office was 
scheduled to be downgraded 
and all mail transferred to and 
handled by the Salt Lake Post 
Office. USPS had made this 
decision because of new 
machinery purchased in Salt 
Lake which was not being fully 
utilized. The fear was that 
slower mail service to Weber 
County would result. The staff 
went to work on the problem 
and the Senator insisted that a 
public hearing be held in 
Ogden. USPS sent officials 
from Washington and the 
Regional offices. Public com-
ments were accepted and 
assurances were given. 
Senator Hatch chaired the 
meeting. Despite the public 
outcry, the USPS implemented 
the "consolidation" of the two 
Post Offices. 
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Hatch Bill to 
Rescue Black 
Lung Fund 
Approved 
Last year Congress enacted legislation 
recommended by Senator Hatch to restore 
solvency to the black lung benefits trust 
fund. Prior to the legislation the trust fund 
was falling increasingly in debt to the 
Treasury. The benefits of persons going on 
the rolls since 1973 were being placed in 
grave jeopardy through staggering in-
debtedness. 
The bill enacted last December was 
the substance of a proposal introduced by 
Senator Hatch (S.1922). It was because of 
the efforts of Senator Hatch as Chairman 
of the Labor Committee that hearings were 
held on the measure, with passage quickly 
thereafter. 
All coal miners in Utah currently re-
ceiving black lung benefits are aided by 
this legislation, plus all coal miners who in 
the future may have to apply for such bene-
fits. In September, 1981, a total of 1,863 
Utahns were collecting $437,000 aggregate 
in monthly benefits from the Black Lung 
Trust Fund. 
"Coal miners make great contribu-
tions to Utah's economy and culture, and 
we all benefit. It's only fair that Congress 
should provide some kind of assurances 
that any who may be afflicted with black 
lung can get the aid they have been promis-
ed," Senator Hatch said at the time. 
Hatch Training 
for Jobs Act 
Means Work 
for Utah 
Senator Hatch sponsored the Training for 
Jobs Act to replace CETA. The Act estab-
lishes a new system for providing training 
services to economically disadvantaged 
Americans to enable them to get meaning-
ful jobs in the private sector and reduce 
their dependence on welfare. It will provide 
a greater emphasis on training, less federal 
involvement, performance evaluation and 
input from the private sector. 
The Act will provide training for ap-
proximately 6,500 Utahns, or over 2,000 
more than are currently served under 
CETA. Senator Hatch played an important 
role in getting the measure passed. 
"The bill we passed recognizes that 
government can't do the job alone, and for 
the first time private enterprise and govern-
ment will work together to train people for 
jobs," Senator Hatch said. "The Training 
for Jobs Act recognizes that it is the private 
sector which will hire individuals gradu-
ating from these training programs." 
United Transportation Union 
WASHINGTON OFFICE 
September 30, 1982 
Honorable Orrin G. Hatch 
12,5 Russell Building 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
Dear Senator Hatch: 
I take pleasure in advising you that our organiza-
tion has endorsed you for re-election to the United 
States Senate from the State of Utah in the November 
2 General Election. 
Our members in your State are being informed of 
this action, and we wish you the best of luck. 
Kind personal regards. 
Respectfully, 
S4/W 
(y.R. (JIM) SNYDER 
National Legislative Director 
crease the appropriation fo the Job Corps 
by $10 million. 
The Senator also authored the amend-
ment to the proposed Youth Act to raise 
wages from $7,200 to 8,000 for country 
public service employment under CETA to 
Hatch 
Champions 
Youth through 
Programs 
Senator Hatch supported a one-year exten-
sion of CETA youth programs. Signed into 
law by President Reagan and funded at 
$576 million this legislation was a great aid 
to the people of Salt Lake and Davis Coun-
ty, where 60-65 percent of their training pro-
grams are youth oriented. 
Utah's junior senator has also been 
credited with saving the Job Corps pro-
gram for disadvantaged, hard-to-employ 
youth. After fighting to retain authorization 
for the program, Senator Hatch offered an 
amendment, which was adopted, to in-
permit greater placement of trainees with 
private sector employers. The concept of 
this amendment was formulated during 
discussions with Salt Lake County Com-
missioner Bill Dunn. 
Senator Hatch supported funding for 
federal training programs authorizing $3.8 
billion for employment and trainir -j pro-
grams, such as CETA, which was responsi-
ble for training some 4,473 people in Utah 
in 1981. 
Hatch Urges End to Age 
Discrimination 
This past summer Senator Hatch co-
sponsored legislation to prohibit 
employers from manditorily retiring an in-
dividual solely based on age. 
Following the lead of the Utah legisla-
ture, which removed the mandatory retire-
ment age, Senator Hatch co-sponsored the 
Prohibition of Mandatory Retirement and 
Employment Rights Act, S. 2617. 
"All persons, regardless of age, should 
be given the opportunity to be judged on the 
basis of their own skills and experience," 
the Senator said. "They should not be ar-
bitrarily excluded from work simply 
because of the inexorable passage of time." 
A Utah incident involving the former 
principal of a Sandy, Utah, school provided 
the Senator with an example of both age 
discrimination and the rising national sen-
timent against it. Earl Cox, principal of the 
Edgemont School, was forced to retire in 
1972 and later joined forces with the 
American Association of Retired Persons 
and the Retired Teachers Association to 
work for an amendment to Utah's age 
discrimination statute. 
"We should be trying to keep men and 
women such as Earl Cox in the work force 
instead of arbitrarily dismissing them for 
no other reason than their own good health 
and longevity," the Senator said. "An im-
portant first step would be for the federal 
government to follow the example of the 
Utah legislature and uncap the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act." Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Reprint from Spectrum 
ORRIN G. HATCH: A FAMILY MAN AT HOME Al 
by Crai 
Hatch has, in little more than five years, 
become one of the most influential forces 
in the United States Senate. Whether that 
influence is positive or negative is a judg-
ment subjective in nature; he does wield 
substantial influence. But how does a man 
who basically was a stranger to national 
politics prior to his election in 1976 rise to 
such a position so rapidly? 
The reasons perhaps are as many as 
they are varied. It might be said he was a 
man in the right place at the right time. It 
might be said he was lucky. It might be said 
he fell into it! The real reasons, however, 
are much less superficial. 
Another viewpoint 
To understand those reasons, one must 
understand the man. 
Frank Silbey is chief investigator for 
the Senate Labor and Human Resources 
Committee oversight office and has spent 
151/2 years as an investigator with various 
government agencies, working most of 
those years with Democrats. 
"Hatch is extremely interested," 
Silbey says, "in oversight and investigation 
into the functions of government. He 
shows enormous courage in dealing with 
politically sensitive investigations. When 
the crunch comes, he has the courage of a 
conviction to follow through because the 
public interest is involved." 
"He has never put any pressure on us 
to kill or redirect an investigation. I would 
give him fantastic grades for guts and 
brains and the willingness to use his 
authority in the public interest. Very few 
.politicians have Hatch's guts and courage. 
He is tough and objective. 
Family is number one 
Away from the political glitter of the 
nation's capital, however, there is another 
side of Orrin Hatch that contributes as 
much to his personal drive—perhaps more 
so—as do his reputation and abilities on 
Capital Hill. 
He is an intensely private man during 
those few moments not claimed by the 
rigors of being a United States Senator. 
And when he finds such a moment, his first 
love is spending it with his family. 
"My family," Hatch says, "is my first 
interest. I have a difficult time involving 
them in politics. They want to be involved, 
but I have a tendency to try to shelter 
them." 
"That's why when I have some time to 
spend with them, I like to put politics aside. 
One of my favorite things is to play golf 
with my 11 year-old son. In some ways I 
hesitate taking the time away from govern-
ment business to do it, but it is a thrill to 
me to be able to walk down the fairway 
arm-in-arm with my son." 
He also enjoys relaxing with his 
12-year-old daughter, writing to his mis-
sionary son, reading—when it isn't a must, 
and most sports. The former attorney has 
participated in footbal l , basketball, 
baseball, golf, and boxing. He won 11 of 12 
fights as an amateur, six by knockout. 
Even in family life, however, there are 
those times when his profession causes 
ripples, even if the ripples are in jest. 
While trying to make a point to the 
family, Hatch once was interrupted by his 
son Scott, who is now serving an LDS mis-
sion in Arcadia, Calif. 
"Listen," Scott said, gathering all the 
seriousness he could, "I think you need to 
know that your being a United States 
Senator doesn't cut any ice around here." 
The masquerade of seriousness, how-
ever, quickly broke down and both father 
and son soon were hugging each other and 
laughing. 
The third son and sixth of nine 
children born to Jesse and Helen Hatch, of 
Midvale, Orrin Hatch enjoys his family 
heritage. He often is accused of being a 
non-Utah Senator, a favorite tactic of his 
political adversaries, but he is proud of his 
family roots that are deep in Utah history. 
"My great-grandfather," Hatch says, 
"founded Vernal and the Ashley Valley 
area in the mid-1880's, and just about 
everywhere I go in this state I find families 
that tie in with my pioneer ancestors." 
Young union member 
Hatch entered his father's trade when only 
16 years of age, becoming a journeyman 
metal lather with the AFL-CIO, a trade that 
"Of all the awards, 
citations and honors he 
has received, the one of 
which he is perhaps most 
proud is the certificate of 
apprenticeship comple-
tion in the AFL-CIO." 
later was used to help put himself through 
Brigham Young University. Of all the 
awards, citations and honors he has receiv-
ed, the one of which he is perhaps most 
proud is the certificate of apprenticeship 
completion in the AFL-CIO. 
While carrying 18 to 21 hours of class-
load, he worked full-time—two of those 
years as a janitor and the others as a metal 
lather—to obtain a degree in history and 
philosophy. He then obtained a full-honors 
scholarship to the University of Pittsburgh 
Law School, earning his Juris Doctor de-
gree in 1962. 
"When I graduated," he said, "I traded 
the high pay some other graduates were 
getting for some good training, and I was 
fortunate to get it with a small but very 
good firm in Pittsburgh." 
He later became a full partner in the 
firm, but in 1969 Hatch decided with his 
wife Elaine they wanted to raise their fami-
ly In Utah. The two are the parents of six 
children and soon will become grandpar-
ents, as their son Brent—who is attending 
Columbia Law School—and his wife are ex-
pecting their first child in June. 
"We knew Utah was the place we 
wanted to live and raise our family," Hatch 
said, "so we were very positive about mak-
ing the move and are very happy we did so." 
"Having been a card-
carrying member of a 
union, I know what it is 
like for the workers. It is 
for them—the union 
workers—that I am 
fighting. I believe in the 
men and women of the 
unions. . . HATCH 
Hatch has been instrumental in sev-
eral bills of interest to Utah workers. He 
fought to keep the Geneva steel plant in 
Orem open by taking on the EPA's air 
standards. By keeping air standards 
reasonable at Kennecott Copper's opera-
tion on the west side of the Salt Lake 
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Valley, some 7,000 jobs were saved. 
Working with Garn, the two Utah sena-
tors were able to keep the vital Central 
Utah Project from being axed by the Carter 
Administration. 
"The House dumped the bill into the 
Senate," Hatch said, "so Jake (Garn) and I 
each took half the Senate and worked until 
we had 68 votes—enough to keep this im-
portant project alive for Utah." 
Hatch, along with Senator Edward 
Kennedy (D-Mass.) is a co-sponsor of the 
Radiation Compensation Act for victims of 
nuclear fallout during Nevada testing. 
"The government was wrong to do 
that," he said, "and when government is 
wrong, it should pay its bills." 
Hatch also worked to sponsor legis-
lation for health victims at Hill Air Force 
Base and has helped with funding for the 
small business center and pharmacy 
department at the University of Utah. 
"Having been a card-carrying member 
of a union," he says, "I know what it is like 
for the workers. It is for them—the union 
workers—that I am fighting. I believe in the 
men and women of the unions. When labor 
is right, I will vote for them. But I don't 
believe in their leaders. That is where I feel 
the problem lies." 
To say union bosses are not fond of 
Orrin Hatch would be a substantial exer-
cise in understatement. The Utah Senator, 
however, enjoys relating an experience he 
had with the late George Meany, Mr. 
Organized Labor himself. 
Shortly after his successful filibuster 
against the labor reform bill, he was to at-
tend a reception for long-time Kentucky 
Senator John Sherman Cooper. As Hatch 
entered the reception, there sat Meany "in 
all his splendor," Hatch extended his hand 
and said, "I'm Orrin Hatch." 
"I know who you are," Meany snapped. 
Meany then stood, put his arm on 
Hatch's shoulder and said, "Orrin, we 
respect you. We didn't think anyone could 
beat us. We control the Presidency, we own 
Congress and we own the bureaucracy we 
created. No hard feelings, but if it costs us 
$4 million in 1982, we'll beat you." 
"I truly admired his 
(Meany's) foreign policy, 
in fact, I feel organized 
labor's foreign policy 
often is more sound than 
that of our govern-
ment . . . HATCH 
A broad smile creased Hatch's face. 
"Gee, Mr. Meany," he replied, "if you 
put $4 million into Utah in 1982, that will 
double our GNP, and I'll be an instan-
taneous hit in the state." 
Meany laughed long and hard, the two 
parting as friends and remaining so to the 
day Meany died. 
"I truly admired his (Meany's) foreign 
policy," Hatch said, "in fact, I feel organ-
ized labor's foreign policy often is more 
sound than that of our government." 
The wisdom of experience 
Five years and a few months of life as a 
Senator have given Hatch a slightly dif-
ferent perspective of government from the 
one he had at the outset. No longer does he 
see everything in black and white. Many 
things, he had found, come in various 
shades of gray. That is not to say, however, 
he has changed his ideals. 
"Most Senators basically are good peo-
ple," Hatch said. "Working with them I have 
learned that compromise often is neces-
sary. But not when it concerns a principle. 
"I still feel a little new to this game. 
But I feel this is the most serious time in 
our nation's history." 
One of the office slogans frequently 
used by Hatch is "Try to shorten the time 
for effectiveness." He wishes more 
legislators felt that way and says, when 
pressed, there are three things he dislikes 
pertaining to the Senate. 
"First, the time it takes away from my 
family," he said. "That is very difficult for 
me. Second, the lack of statesmanship 
shown by those who put their personal 
political skin ahead of their country. And 
third, the entrenchment of the philosophy 
of taking tax dollars to buy constituent 
votes with costly special programs." 
He lists our country's most pressing 
issues as inflation, high interest rates, 
unemployment and a sub-par national 
defense. In addition to work on issues, 
however, he and his staff also concentrate 
heavily on constituent service. 
"We worked on more than 1,800 cases 
in the last year," Martin said, "and if any 
Utahn comes to Orrin's office, he tries very 
hard to see them. That's just another thing 
that keeps him so busy. Even with seeing 
as many people as he can and his heavy 
committee assignments, he still manages 
to maintain a very high voting record." 
During his five years in the Senate, 
Hatch has a 94 percent voting record—97 
percent in 1981. The demand on his time 
and energy, however, apparently has not 
dimmed his enthusiasm for what he is 
doing. 
"Elaine and I have never looked back," 
he says. "She was a little reticent about my 
running in 1976 because she felt we had 
things going well in our law practice and 
didn't want to see me hurt." 
"But she has become my biggest sup-
porter. She also is my best critic and the 
first to step in and tell me if she thinks I'm 
doing something wrong." 
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LABOR AND CONGRESS 
Bargaining For a Better America 
by Senator Orrin Hatch 
Honor carries obligation. With the honor of 
•enough union votes to help elect Ronald 
Reagan last November, Republicans earn-
ed the obligation to watch out for the 
"American union worker," an obligation 
shirked by the Democrats, the "traditional" 
blue-collar party. 
It's a heavy obligation, an enormous 
duty. It's a task we Republicans actively 
sought however; we should work to fulfill 
our commitments as well as we can. And 
so we shall. 
What are the interests of the American 
union member? Having grown up in a union 
family and having been a union man my-
self, I can say they are the same as those 
of most other Americans. Union families 
want to own their homes, stow away some 
cash for rainy days and future oppor-
tunities, and keep up with the bills for day-
to-day necessities. That's not a lot—but it 
has been increasingly difficult to do with 
inflation sprouting like Jack's magic 
beans. 
Union families want to own their 
homes, stow away some cash 
for rainy days and future opor-
tunities, and keep up with the 
bills for day-to-day necessities. 
Union wages have grown enormously 
over the past decade, but union members 
suffered the same frustrations the rest of 
us did. Median income for American fami-
lies of four was just over $28,000 last year; 
but that $28,000 bought far less than it 
would have ten years earlier. All families 
found it difficult to make food dollars 
stretch to cover what they used to cover; 
the price of energy made it difficult to stay 
warm in winter; and sometimes made it dif-
ficult even to get to work. High interest 
rates made home ownership much more a 
memory than a dream. 
Whatever other faults the leaders of 
America's labor unions may have, even 
they recognized these problems. The late 
Teamsters President Frank E. Fitzsimmons 
told the Washington Star just after the 
election, "The large vote for President-
elect Reagan is a mandate to curb infla-
tion, which has been strangling American 
workers, and to once again put America 
back to work." 
Republican leadership in the United 
States Senate has worked hard to set an 
agenda that will benefit America's union 
members—and all other Americans as 
well. As I write this—eight months into the 
first Republican-controlled Senate in a 
quarter of a century—our efforts have 
already come to partial fruition. We have 
already: created several block grants, pass-
ing much of the decision-making authority 
G o v e r n m e n t r e g u l a t i o n too 
often assumes that workers and 
managers are mortal enemies, 
and uses that assumption to 
design regulations and enforce-
ment that do not serve as wel l as 
they could. 
to state and local governments, thereby 
reducing overhead at the federal level; 
reduced federal spending significantly (by 
25 percent in the programs over which my 
committee, the Committee on Labor and 
Human Resources, has jurisdiction) while 
preserving programs necessary for those 
who literally have no other place to turn (we 
preserved programs for the handicapped 
with very few cuts, for example); cut taxes, 
so that by 1983 that "average union family" 
will have an extra $1,000 annually, to put 
down on the new house, to save for 
Junior's college education, to put towards 
a more comfortable retirement. 
Some of the other items on our agenda 
may be more difficult. We are concerned, 
for example, about the safety of workers. 
While the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration was established to work for 
greater safety on the job, statistics tell us 
that jobs are not safer for the effort. At the 
same time, businesses experience great 
difficulties complying with safety rules 
that are often costly, sometimes difficult to 
enforce among workers, occasionally con-
tradictory to other safety rules, and too 
often ineffective. In short, the regulatory 
web intended to protect workers is really 
more red tape for employers than a safety 
net for employees. 
The issues are complex, and will get a 
thorough airing before any action is taken 
legislatively. Government regulation too 
often assumes that workers and managers 
are mortal enemies, and uses that assump-
tion to design regulations and enforcement 
that do not serve as well as they could. 
Workers comprise the most valuable 
assets of businesses. Government safety 
rules should be designed to encourage 
businessmen to seek help to protect that 
most valuable asset. Workers and man-
agers together will do more to improve 
safety in the workplace, and do it more ef-
fectively, than a perpetually under-staffed 
federal regulatory agency ever could. 
Employees, whether members of a 
union or not, will be more productive in a 
workplace made safer by the cooperative 
efforts of labor and management. Being 
more productive, they will make more 
money. Taxed less, they will save more of 
that money for the future. With more 
money in banks, businesses will find it 
easier to expand, innovate and renovate. 
It is our obligation to rebuild the 
economy, to put the country to 
work , and to leave more of the 
fruits of labor wi th the laborers. 
Workers will also find it easier to get the 
money to buy a home. Increased demand 
for new homes will create more jobs, which 
will be safer when government regulations 
encourage protection of workers rather 
than a proliferation of regulations. 
Union members aspire to a better life, 
and opportunity to carve even a better ex-
istence for their children. It is a great 
tribute to the American labor movement 
that union families' incomes are high 
enough to qualify for the 33 percent tax 
bracket. But when that happens largely as 
a result of inflation, it is well beyond time 
for a change. Union members have made 
great contributions to this nation. With a 
Republican Administration and Republican 
control of the Senate we have an enormous 
opportunity, and a great obligation, to 
return those many favors. It is our obliga-
tion to rebuild the economy, to put the 
country to work, and to leave more of the 
fruits of labor with the laborers. 
We can watch out for the union 
member by carefully watching out for the 
union member's tax dollars; spending them 
wisely and spending them less. A healthy 
economy is the ticket to more jobs, higher 
savings, and greater opportunity for our 
working men and women. 
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Hatch Accomplishments for Utah 
More Jobs & Economic Growth for Utah 
Central Utah Project 
• The Central Utah Project was on Presi-
dent Carter's hit list to eliminate all fund-
ing. All of Utah's delegation and the Gover-
nor worked well together to save the pro-
ject so vital to Utah's future. The House, 
rather than strip out the bad projects, pass-
ed a combined water project bill with the 
bad projects included, which President 
Carter threatened to veto. Senator Hatch 
and Senator Gam each took half of the 
Senate and worked one on one with their 
colleagues to get the bad projects out. 
When all the votes were counted, the Cen-
tral Utah Project was saved in the Senate. 
The House passed the bill and the Presi-
dent signed it into law. The Washington 
Post wrote on January 25, 1982, that 
Senator Hatch "twisted enough arms on 
the Senate floor to rescue it (the C.U.P. Pro-
ject)." 
Jobs through Coal 
• In the interest of expanding Utah's coal 
export market, Senator Hatch went to Nor-
theast Asia, including Taiwan, and met 
with end-users of coal products. Contracts 
have subsequently been signed, and both 
the Taiwanese and the Utah exporter credit 
Senator Hatch with making the contracts 
possible. These contracts create jobs for 
Utah as well as bringing money into the 
State. The contracts are valued at 400 
million dollars. 
Inflation 
• Senate Joint Resolution 58, cosponsored 
by Senator Hatch requires the federal 
government to balance its budget and in-
cludes a built-in tax spending limitation. 
Persistently high levels of inflation and 
unemployment and levels of growth and 
productivity all can be traced directly or in-
directly to the fiscal problems of the 
federal government. 
Retiree Benefits 
• Amendment to the Continuing Ap-
propriations Resolution H.J. Reslution 357, 
to restore full funding of "dual benefits" to 
railroad retirees. 
On November 19,1981, Senator Hatch 
cosponsored a successful amendment to 
J.J. Res. 357 to add $90 million to the "dual 
benefits" appropriation made each year on 
behalf of railroad retirees who accrued 
pension rights prior to 1974. 
Housing Mortgage Investments 
• Senator Hatch sponsored this legisla-
tion to ease the rules under ERISA so as to 
allow for the investment in residential 
housing mortgages by private pensions 
otherwise restricted from investing in such 
securities. 
Hill Air Force Base Hearings 
• As a result of oversight hearings con-
ducted by Senator Hatch which were held 
at Hill Air Force Base in Ogden, Utah, the 
National Cancer Institute and Rocky Moun-
tain Center for Occupational and Environ-
mental Health are conducting feasibility 
and mortality studies on job-related ill-
nesses contracted by Hill employees. 
Cancer Eye Project 
• Federal support for research was needed 
to assure Utah's trail-blazing medical and 
scientific programs researching causes of 
cancer. In particular, Doctor Klein-
schuster's pioneer work at Utah State 
University to treat cancer in the eyes of cer-
tain cattle is playing a critical role in curing 
this most devastating disease. Senator 
Hatch and the Utah delegation have work-
ed to maintain past funding and restore 
current funding for this program. Dr. 
Kleinschuster submitted two proposals to 
the N.C.I, in 1982, and they are currently 
being reviewed. 
Salt Lake Indian Health Center 
• Senator Hatch, assisting Senator Garn, 
is working to maintain the $8.1 million in 
the Interior Appropriations budget that 
would support continuing health services 
to urban Indians in the Greater Salt Lake 
area. 
Saving Utah's Swing Bed Programs 
• In 1979, The Carter Administration 
threatened to cut off funding for the swing 
bed program, a cost-saving measure that 
minimizes the number of unused health 
facilities. 
Senator Hatch interceded to save this 
program, preserving an important aspect of 
our nation's program to fight health cost in-
flation and establishing an important prin-
ciple that Utah would not be taken for 
granted by federal regulatory agencies. 
Community Home Health Services Act 
• Senator Hatch introduced this legisla-
tion, which has passed the Labor and 
Human Resources Committee, in order to 
provide home health care to the thousands 
of elderly in Utah and across the nation 
who are annually forced into nursing 
homes because they needed medical help 
or minor support which wasn't available at 
home. This legislation expands Medicare 
to include home health services not reim-
burseable under current law and will make 
available limited amounts of grants and 
loans for high priority demonstration proj-
ects in home health care. This legislation is 
not only humane but cost conscious be-
cause of the savings effectuated in re-
duced demand for nursing home expansion 
and the reduction in hospital bed days 
each year. 
Atomic Bomb Fallout Compensation 
• Senator Hatch introduced this legisla-
tion to compensate the citizens of Utah, 
Nevada and Arizona who were exposed to 
radiation during the atomic bomb testing in 
the 1950's at the Nevada test site. These 
citizens were not adequately warned of the 
dangers of radioactive fallout, and it is pro-
per, then, that the government should com-
pensate them for the losses they suffered 
as a result. Senator Hatch introduced S. 
1483, the Radiation Exposure Compensa-
tion Act to compensate property damage 
and injured parties in an attempt to, in part, 
repay them for their losses. The Labor and 
Human Resources Committee reported the 
bill out in April, and it has passed Judiciary 
Subcommittee and is now awaiting action 
by the full Judiciary Committee. 
Student Financial Assistance 
• Last year it was proposed that the 
Guaranteed Student Loan in-school in-
terest subsidy be repealed and eligibility 
sharply restricted. As Chairman of the 
Senate conferees on the Budget Recon-
ciliation Act, Senator Hatch played a 
crucial role in turning back these pro-
posals. The resulting compromise made 
significant savings in the program while 
maintaining nearly all in-school benefits 
for students in need. 
Veteran's Cost of Instruction Program 
• Senator Hatch single-handedly saved 
the Veterans's Cost of Instruction Program 
from extinction in the Senate-House con-
ference on the 1981 Budget Reconciliation 
Act, where he led the Senate confrees. 
Utah has developed a nationally-
recognized model Veteran's Cost of In-
struction program on veteran counseling, 
with Marv Peterson of Weber State College 
at the forefront. Continued VCIP funding 
not only sustains Utah's initiative, it better 
serves our state's many veterans, to whom 
we owe a continuing debt of gratitude. 
Older Americans and Aging 
• The Older Americans Act (P.L 97-115) 
sponsored by Senator Hatch and Senator 
Denton was reauthorized and signed into 
law on December 29,1981. This legislation 
funds such vital services as nutrition pro-
grams, senior citizens centers, information 
and referral systems and transportation. 
Since 1965, this particular Act has touched 
the lives of over 9 million senior Americans, 
150,000 of them in Utah. 
Dependent Care Service Provisions 
Amendment 
• This amendment, introduced July 24, 
1981 by Senator Metzenbaum and Senator 
Hawkins, and co-sponsored by Senator 
Hatch, passed the Senate and became part 
of the H.J. Res 266. It provides an expanded 
tax credit for working parents who must 
pay day-care expenses for children and will 
be a part of the tax reform package 
available for the 1982 calendar year. 
Home Energy Assistance Grants 
• This is also known as Low-Income 
Energy Assistance or Fuel Assistance for 
the Elderly. 
Senator Hatch cosponsored S.1724 
which passed into law on November 15, 
1979 (P.L. 96-223), after hearings held in 
Salt Lake City revealed that even residents 
of energy-rich states can have difficulty 
paying heating bills. This brought $13.6 
million of Federal funds into Utah to aid the 
21,000 eligible households. The program 
was changed to a block grant in the Recon-
ciliation Conference in 1981, which Senator 
Hatch chaired. 
The Head Start Act 
• Introduced April 30, 1981 by Senator 
Denton and Senator Hatch. This bill was re-
authorized as a part of the Omnibus Recon-
ciliation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-35). Senator 
Hatch authored provisions so that funds 
are allocated to states proportionately, ac-
cording to the number of eligible children, 
and to require local evaluation of programs. 
With the highest birth rates in the na-
tion, Utah has a very high number of poten-
tially eligible Head Start children, as well 
as an excellent group of child and family 
scholars who can assist in providing 
evaluations of local Head Start programs. 
Legislator of the Year Award 
• The U.S. Health Association gave 
Senator Hatch its Legislator of the Year 
Award in 1978. Utah's variety of health in-
stitutions includes the most efficiently run, 
non-profit hospitals in the country as well 
as some of the smallest. Their funding 
base needed to be protected from a federal 
establishment that could get jealous of our 
state's health endowments success story. 
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Llewellyn Jenkins Hatch Says 
We Must Provide Jobs 
a 
< 
"The workers here in Utah, as well as across our nation, 
face problems," Hatch continued. "The most significant 
thing that we can do is to create an economic environment 
that will provide jobs for our unemployed workers. 
"We are working to protect American industry from un-
fair foreign competition. When properly equipped and allow-
ed to work in an atmosphere free from over-regulation and 
counter-productive taxation the American labor force is as 
productive as any in the world. 
"The working people are the backbone of Utah and the 
Nation. Although these are rough times, our workers have 
faith in the future. With that faith and determination, the 
obstacles will be overcome." 
"Our own unemployment rate in Utah 
has been rising, generally because off 
layoffs in mining and manufacturing. 
In fact, between October off 1 9 8 1 and 
Marcu of i 9 6 £ , j»,53G p«^p ie L\ \»*ar) 
were displaced due to plant closings 
and major layoffs. The figures are 
really overwhelming. I have introduc-
ed the Displaced Worker Readjust-
ment Act to tackle this prob lem." 
—SENATOR HATCH 
"Amer ican working men and women 
don't a lways vote the way some na-
tional union leaders necessarily l ike. 
I 'm the product off a working class 
b a c k g r o u n d , a n d m y i m m e d i a t e 
po l i t i ca l and soc ia l c i r c l e s ar^ r i c h In 
what pollsters would probably call 
working class ci t izens. Like many 
other Utahns, they don't take orders 
from the AFL-CIO or any other Wash-
ington-based power . " 
—SENATOR HATCH 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHEILA ANN COX, et al. , : 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiffs, 
CIVIL NO. C-82-9228 
vs. : 
ORRIN HATCH, et al., 
Defendants. : 
The defendants' Motion to Dismiss came before the Court 
on March 28, 1983. Plaintiffs were represented by their counsel, 
Brian M. Barnard, the defendants were represented by their 
counsel, Robert S. Campbell, Jr. The Court noted and was 
advised by counsel for defendants that defendants1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment had been withdrawn based upon the stipulation 
of the parties that the Munion newsletter11 could be considered 
by the Court in determining the defendants! Motion to Dismiss 
for failure to state a cause of action. The Court heard 
argument of counsel in support of their respective positions. 
Following submission of the matter to the Court, the Court took 
the defendants1 Motion under advisement to further consider the 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted by the parties, 
and to further consider the Court's entire file. The Court has 
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now reviewed the legal authorities presented, and otherwise ( 
being fully advised in the premises, enters the following 
Memorandum Decision. 
Based upon the parties stipulation that the "union < 
newsletter" can be considered in connection with this Motion 
to Dismiss, the Court will do so, even though a consideration 
of the total "union newsletter" goes beyond the pleadings to * 
some degree. The Court notes, however, that a portion of 
the "union newsletter" was attached to the plaintiffs1 Complaint. 
The photograph that appeared in the "union newsletter" * 
of which the plaintiffs complain constitutes an expression of 
speech, in this case, "political speech". To allow plaintiffs 
to assert a cause of action based upon the photograph as it * 
was presented in this particular situation, would impose and 
constitute a "chilling affect" on what must be under constitutional 
principles the closely guarded right of free speech, and * 
would severely limit a political candidate's right to free 
political expression as constitutionally guaranteed. 
A cause of action as plaintiffs attempt to assert in 
this case would impinge upon the defendants' right of free 
speech and therefore cannot be constitutionally condoned. 
Accordingly, the Court determines that the defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss should be granted on constitutional grounds alone, 
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and the claims of abuse of identity, defamation or invasion 
of privacy espoused by the plaintiffs need not be addressed. 
The plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a cause of 
action upon which relief can be granted, and is therefore 
dismissed as a matter of law. Defendants1 counsel is requested 
to prepare an Order in accordance with this Decision, and 
submit the same to the Court for consideration in accordance 
with Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts 
of the State of Utah. 
Dated this <S day of 
NSON, DISTRICT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HSNDLEY 
CiorK 
•t-^^ie^-
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this fo day of April, 1983: 
Brian M. Barnard 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr. 
Attorney for Defendants 
310 South Main, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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APPENDIX—Continued 
The Load: Some Latins buy so much in Miami they've been known to rent an extra hotel room just to store their purchases. 
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